INTRODUCTION: WARNING SIGNS OF A TERMINAL CRISIS
In May 2025, Algeria shows all the signs of a state in systemic crisis. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, reelected in September 2024 under highly contested conditions (84.3% of the vote with actual participation estimated at less than 10% according to independent observers), sees his political legitimacy eroding at an accelerated pace. His personal trajectory perfectly illustrates the contradictions of a system where civilian power is merely a façade behind which the real military decision-making centers operate.
Our analysis is based on several distinct and converging sources that report established contacts (and attempted contacts) between various Algerian military factions and foreign actors in direct conflict with Algiers: Moroccan officials, representatives of the Movement for Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK), and emissaries from the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). These approaches, unusual in their simultaneity and intensity, signal that a process of power reconfiguration is underway, with the preeminence of the military element – the « olive green » mentioned by our sources – as a constant.
The convergence of destabilizing factors for the regime is unprecedented: programmed resolution of the Sahara issue, crisis with France reaching historic heights, increasingly concrete prospect of classifying the Polisario as a terrorist organization, threat of American sanctions, and finally, an unprecedented regional geopolitical isolation. Faced with these existential challenges, designating a scapegoat becomes a strategic necessity for the Algerian deep state. The removal of Tebboune, potentially accompanied by that of General Saïd Chengriha, would allow the system to regenerate by claiming to « start on a new footing. »
Tebboune’s hospitalization in Germany in late 2020 constitutes an instructive precedent: even then, his removal had been considered by certain power circles. His political survival at that time depended on three conjunctural factors that have now disappeared: the recent start of his mandate, the exceptional context of the pandemic, and French diplomatic support. In 2025, these safeguards have vanished, leaving the president in a position of unprecedented vulnerability.
I. THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL VULNERABILITY
A. Contested legitimacy: the ghost election trap
Massive electoral fraud was indirectly confirmed by the judicial authorities themselves: three former candidates whose applications had been rejected (Saïda Neghza, Belkacem Sahli, and Abdelhakim Hamadi) were sentenced in May 2025 to ten years in prison for buying endorsements from elected officials. The investigation implicated about sixty other people, including many local elected officials, sentenced for electoral corruption. This official recognition of electoral manipulation undermines the entire process and, by extension, the president’s legitimacy.
B. Chronic governmental instability: symptom of fragmented power
Since his inauguration in December 2019, Tebboune has appointed three different Prime Ministers (Abdelaziz Djerad, Aïmene Benabderrahmane, and Nadir Larbaoui) and carried out multiple ministerial reshuffles, a sign of chronic instability. Even more revealing, the appointment of Saïd Chengriha as Deputy Minister of Defense in November 2024 marks an overt militarization of the government and a loss of presidential autonomy.
This ministerial waltz reflects less strategic choices than attempts at balancing acts between rival power factions. The failure to attract prominent figures to government positions reflects the perception of a regime in its final stages, where joining the government now represents a major career risk (with numerous former ministers in prison for corruption).
C. Façade hyper-presidentialism: civilian power under tutelage
The growing influence of the army in Algerian political life contradicts Tebboune’s initial promises of a « new Algeria » with strengthened civilian institutions. The recent decree authorizing the secondment of military officers to civil administration enshrines this creeping militarization. This evolution reveals the deeply contradictory nature of the regime: a façade hyper-presidentialism coupled with effective military tutelage.
The repression of the Hirak required a reinforcement of the repressive arsenal, giving the army and security services increased influence. This dynamic was amplified with the 2020 constitutional revision which, despite rhetoric of a « new Republic, » consolidated existing authoritarian structures while maintaining the status quo regarding the army’s role as the « backbone » of the regime.
II. THE 2020 PRECEDENT: LESSONS FROM AN AVERTED POLITICAL CRISIS
A. Hospitalization in Germany: chronology of a power vacuum
Tebboune’s hospitalization in Germany from October 28, 2020, due to COVID-19 created a major political crisis. His prolonged absence (nearly two months) generated a de facto power vacuum, although not officially recognized. This situation revealed the fragility of Algerian institutions when faced with the unavailability of the head of state, with the system unable to function normally without his presence.
The video posted on Twitter on December 13, 2020, from his convalescence location in Berlin constitutes a key moment in this crisis. This intervention, carried out without prior consultation with the military establishment, aimed to reaffirm his political authority. The choice of Twitter as a communication channel – an international platform beyond the control of Algerian services – and the notable absence of thanks to the army clearly signaled tensions between the presidency and the military institution.
The real reason for this emergency communication from Berlin was to counter an ongoing attempt to remove him in Algiers. According to our sources, discussions had already been initiated within the high military command to activate Article 102 of the Constitution (concerning presidential incapacity). Only the intervention of French services, which alerted Tebboune to these maneuvers, allowed him to react in time and thwart this removal attempt.
B. French support in 2020: a safeguard now gone
Emmanuel Macron’s support for Tebboune in 2020-2021 played a crucial role in maintaining the latter in power. The French president had declared that he would do everything possible « to help President Tebboune, » whom he deemed « courageous » while emphasizing that he was « caught in a system » – a thinly veiled reference to the military constraints hampering presidential action.
This French diplomatic support was a determining factor in Tebboune’s political survival in 2020. However, the spectacular deterioration of Franco-Algerian relations since 2022, culminating with Paris’s implicit recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, has eliminated this diplomatic safeguard. According to breaking news published by the French media outlet « L’Express, » President Macron is even preparing to freeze the assets of about twenty Algerian senior officials with property and financial interests in France, an unprecedented measure directly targeting the ruling elite on which Tebboune depends.
C. The exceptional pandemic context: a stability argument now obsolete
In 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic created an exceptional context favoring institutional stability. Removing Tebboune would have represented an additional factor of instability in an already critical period. In 2025, this constraint has disappeared: the pandemic is no longer a factor of political immobility, opening the way to reconfigurations that the health emergency had temporarily frozen.
Moreover, the recent start of Tebboune’s first term in 2020 argued for a certain continuity. In 2025, nearly a year into his second term and after more than five years in power, this factor no longer works in his favor. The record of his governance, marked by failed promised reforms and worsening socio-economic problems, no longer constitutes an argument for stability but rather a factor of vulnerability.
III. THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL CHESSBOARD: ALGERIA ISOLATED
A. Regional diplomatic encirclement: a coordinated strategy
Tebboune’s Algeria faces unprecedented diplomatic isolation since independence. The rupture of relations with Morocco in 2021, growing tensions with the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), deteriorating relations with France and Spain, loss of influence in Libya, and most importantly, the distancing of its traditional Russian ally paint a picture of strategic encirclement.
This isolation is not the result of chance but stems from a coordinated strategy where the United Arab Emirates play a central role. The recent diplomatic sequence – Sheikh Shakhboot Bin Nahyan Al Nahyan’s visit to the three AES capitals followed by Saddam Haftar’s mission to Niger – materializes the activation of an encirclement strategy orchestrated from Abu Dhabi, exploiting Sahelian fractures to redraw regional balances to Algiers’ detriment.
B. The Kabyle dossier: a reactivated time bomb
Kabylie, with its 6 million inhabitants and significant economic resources, represents 15% of the Algerian population concentrated in a strategic territory facing the Mediterranean. Its electoral participation rate of less than 1% in the September 2024 presidential election reveals a de facto democratic secession, creating a political vacuum exploitable by separatist movements.
The external instrumentalization of the Kabyle question is part of a broader strategy aimed at weakening the Algerian state. The precedent of Morocco’s recognition of « Kabylie’s self-determination » in July 2021 opened a diplomatic breach that other regional actors are now exploiting. This dynamic creates a structural vulnerability that the Algerian power struggles to counter, especially as the repression of the Hirak has considerably reduced the central power’s room for maneuver in Kabylie.
Our sources indicate that certain Algerian military factions, aware of the current impasse, are considering a paradigm shift regarding the Kabyle question. Rather than pursuing counterproductive repression, these « pragmatic » military circles would propose using the leadership change to initiate a process of controlled decentralization, capable of defusing independence claims while preserving formal territorial integrity. This approach would require a new face at the head of state, as Tebboune is too closely identified with the current repression policy.
C. The Polisario mortgage: toward terrorist reclassification
The announcement by U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson of the possible classification of the Polisario as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) would constitute a fatal blow to Algerian diplomacy. This reclassification, if it materializes, would transform Algerian support for the separatist movement into support for a designated terrorist organization, with all the legal and financial consequences that entails.
The prospect of a definitive resolution of the Sahara issue, with growing international recognition of Moroccan sovereignty, removes one of the main levers of Tebboune’s foreign policy. This evolution, combined with Morocco’s growing influence in American and European decision-making bodies, creates an untenable diplomatic situation for the Algerian president, who finds himself defending an increasingly isolated position perceived as anachronistic by international partners.
The financing, arming, and logistical support to the Polisario represent a colossal strategic investment for Algeria for nearly five decades. The probable collapse of this geopolitical project would constitute a major failure for the regime and could precipitate an internal legitimacy crisis. Faced with this prospect, certain Algerian military circles might favor a radical change of course, necessarily involving a change at the head of state.
IV. INTERNAL DYNAMICS: TOWARD A REDISTRIBUTION OF CARDS
A. Rivalries within the military establishment: the faction game
The current imprisonment of 155 senior officers at the Blida military prison – an unprecedented number – reveals the extent of internal purges and fractures within the security establishment. This exceptional situation reflects a clan war that far exceeds the usual framework of internal rivalries and heralds a major recomposition of Algerian military power.
The June 6, 2024 decree strengthening military control over civil affairs has intensified tensions between different factions within the army. This text, which places justice, public enterprises, and administration under direct military supervision, has crystallized the oppositions between proponents of overt regime militarization and those who prefer maintaining a civilian façade of power.
The appointment of Saïd Chengriha as Deputy Minister of Defense in November 2024 marks a further step in this militarization, while revealing internal maneuvers aimed at positioning certain military figures in the perspective of Tebboune’s succession. This strategic placement illustrates the preeminence of the military over the political and especially the glaring dependence of the current president.
B. The persistent socio-economic crisis: fuel for discontent
On the economic front, Tebboune’s record is catastrophic: rampant inflation, massive unemployment (particularly among young people where it exceeds 30%), recurrent shortages of basic necessities (semolina, milk, medicines). This continuing deterioration of living standards fuels growing popular discontent that further weakens the president’s position.
Despite official discourse on economic diversification, Algeria remains dramatically dependent on hydrocarbons, which still represent more than 90% of export revenues. Promises of structural reforms have not been followed by significant effects, while systemic corruption continues to plague the national economy. This economic stagnation reduces the president’s political room for maneuver, as he can no longer rely on the redistribution of oil revenues to buy social peace.
C. Contacts with foreign entities: signals of an ongoing recomposition
These contacts are not solely the actions of marginal actors but involve circles close to the power center. They are part of a logic of anticipated positioning facing an inevitable change at the head of state. The multiplication of these parallel channels reflects an erosion of institutional discipline and growing autonomization of different factions within the security apparatus.
The « olive green » constant mentioned by our sources indicates that these reconfigurations, although diverse in their orientations, all converge toward reinforcing the army’s role in the future power configuration. According to our information, the current power finds itself in a genuine impasse and no longer knows where to turn. This confusion at the top of the state partly explains the multiplication of informal contacts with external actors.
V. PROSPECTIVE SCENARIOS: PATHWAYS TO REMOVAL
A. Scenario 1: Constitutional removal (probability: 45%)
This scenario presents several advantages for the military establishment: it avoids a brutal rupture of legality, preserves a certain institutional stability, and offers a transition period (90 days) allowing preparation for the election of a new president more aligned with military power orientations. Its main strength lies in its ability to maintain the appearance of constitutional continuity, an important element for internal and external regime legitimation.
B. Scenario 2: Forced resignation (probability: 35%)
In this scenario, Tebboune would be forced to resign under the converging pressure of the army and security services. This resignation could be presented as a voluntary act motivated by health reasons or by acknowledging the failure of policies implemented. The pressure exerted would remain discreet but relentless, probably linked to compromising files concerning the presidential family or close collaborators.
This scenario would avoid an open institutional crisis while facilitating controlled power transmission. It would also preserve Algeria’s international image by avoiding the appearance of a military coup. The resignation would probably be followed by a transition period led by the president of the Council of the Nation, in accordance with constitutional provisions, before organizing a carefully supervised early presidential election.
C. Scenario 3: Institutional rupture (probability: 15%)
In the hypothesis of Tebboune’s resistance to pressures aimed at obtaining his resignation, or in case of a major security crisis, direct military intervention remains possible. This scenario would involve a temporary suspension of the Constitution, the formation of a High Security Council assuming executive functions, and the announcement of a « roadmap » for returning to constitutional order. Although less probable due to its diplomatic cost and internal risks, this option remains conceivable if tensions reach a breaking point.
Such an institutional rupture would represent a return to 1990s practices, with an overtly predominant role for the army. It would have the advantage of clarifying the real power relationships within the Algerian system, but would entail significant risks in terms of internal stability and international relations. This scenario could be triggered by a brutal aggravation of the security situation at the borders or by a major internal crisis linked to the Kabyle question.
D. Scenario 4: Early presidential elections (probability: 25%)
The main advantage of this scenario lies in its ability to preserve democratic appearances while allowing controlled change. It would offer an honorable exit for Tebboune while giving the military time to prepare the accession to power of a consensus candidate. This option would also have the advantage of projecting an image of institutional normality internationally, potentially useful for defusing certain diplomatic pressures.
The pre-electoral period would allow different military factions to negotiate a new power-sharing arrangement, while the results would be carefully orchestrated to guarantee the election of the chosen candidate. This scenario would fit into the Algerian tradition of formally democratic but substantially controlled power transmission.
STRATEGIC CONCLUSION: ALGERIA AT THE CROSSROADS
The analysis of President Tebboune’s vulnerability factors reveals an unprecedented convergence of elements unfavorable to his retention of power. The conjunction of internal pressures (regime militarization, economic crisis, contested legitimacy) and external pressures (diplomatic isolation, regional encirclement, imminent resolution of the Saharan issue) creates the conditions for a removal that now appears inevitable in the medium term.
The question is no longer whether Tebboune will complete his term, but rather when and how his departure will occur. The scenarios of constitutional removal, forced resignation, or early elections seem most probable, with the system preferring solutions that preserve an appearance of legality and institutional continuity. In all cases, the army’s role in the transition will be decisive, confirming the preeminence of « olive green » in the future configuration of Algerian power.
– Probability that Tebboune completes his second term (horizon 2029): less than 10%
– Probable timeline for removal: 2-3 months (before the next Security Council meeting on the Sahara)
– Most probable post-Tebboune configuration: civilian presidency under reinforced military control
– Risk of major destabilization in case of poorly managed removal: high
The Algerian politico-military system, whose survival is genuinely threatened by the programmed resolution of the Sahara issue, the crisis with France, the prospect of classifying the Polisario as a terrorist organization, and regional geopolitical isolation, now seeks a scapegoat. The removal of Tebboune (and potentially Chengriha) would allow the system to regain momentum and claim to « start on a new footing, » while keeping its fundamental power structures intact.
This analysis does not aim to predict the future but to illuminate the deep trends shaping Algeria’s political trajectory. In this context of uncertainty, vigilance is essential regarding developments in the coming months, which could accelerate or slow down the countdown of the Tebboune presidency, without however altering its probable outcome.
